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a b s t r a c t
Certificate-based cryptography overcomes the inherent shortcomings in traditional public
key cryptography and identity-based cryptography. It provides effective mechanisms
to design efficient public key cryptography systems with less reliance on underlying
infrastructure. As a classic primitive in public key cryptography, signcryption performs
signature and encryption in a single logical step, by integrating confidentiality, integrity,
authentication and non-repudiation much more efficiently than the traditional sign-
then-encrypt approach. In this paper, we first define an enhanced security model for
certificate-based signcryption. We then analyze an existing certificate-based signcryption
scheme, and show that it is insecure due to two classic attacks. Furthermore, we
propose a new certificate-based signcryption scheme. Our scheme is proven secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and adaptive chosen message attacks in the random
oracle model.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is a new public key encryption mechanism introduced by Gentry [1] in Eurocrypt
2003. As in the traditional PKI, each client in CBE generates its own public/private key pair and the Certificate Authority
(CA) then generates a certificate which can guarantee the authenticity of the client’s public key. In CBE, the certificate
has an additional feature, namely it also acts a partial private key. A successful decryption requires both the private key
and the up-to-date certificate. This provides an implicit verification of one’s certificate and eliminates third-party queries
for certificate status required in traditional PKI. Since CA does not know the client’s private key, there is no key escrow
problem in CBE (which however is an inherent problem in identity-based public key encryption [2]). Furthermore, CBE
does not have the secret key distribution problem, as opposed to certificateless public key encryption [3]. Thus, certificate-
based encryption provides an efficient mechanism to design public key encryption, which requires less infrastructure and
overcomes the inherent shortcomings in the aforementioned public key systems. Since its introduction in [1], certificate-
based cryptography has attracted the attention of many researchers, and a number of certificate-based encryption and
signature algorithms have been proposed so far, e.g. [1,4–12]. Following Gentry’s idea, Kang, Park and Hahn proposed
the security notion of certificate-based signature (CBS) [5]. They also proposed two concrete certificate-based signature
schemes and a certificate-based proxy signature scheme. Unfortunately, Li et al. [7] pointed out that one of their schemes
was insecure against key replacement attack. They refined the security model of certificate-based signature and proposed a
new efficient certificate-based signature scheme. Wu et al. [11] revisited the security models of certificate-based signature
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schemes. They divided the potential adversaries into three types: normal adversary, strong adversary and super adversary
by attacking power. Recently, Li et al. [6,13] presented a certificate-based signature scheme, which is provably secure in the
standard model. Furthermore, they proposed an efficient short certificate-based signature scheme, which requires only one
pairing operation in signature generation and verification. In addition, the signature size of their scheme is only one group
element.
The concept of public key signcryption was proposed by Zheng in 1997 [14]. The purpose of this primitive is to perform
signature and encryption in a single logical step and thus signcryption can provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication
and non-repudiation in a more efficient way than the traditional sign-then-encrypt approach. The drawback of the latter
solution is the high cost in both computation and communication. Several efficient signcryption schemes [15–26] have
been proposed since 1997 and the first scheme with formal security proofs in well-defined security models was proposed
in [27]. Seo and Kim [28] proposed a domain-verifiable signcryption scheme, which is applied to the electronic funds
transfer protocol. Mu and Varadharajan [29] proposed a distributed signcryption scheme that can be used for distributing
a signcrypted message to a designated group. This definition can be extended for transmission of information between two
or more designated groups. This means that any member of the designated group can signcrypt the message on behalf
of the group and distribute it to the receiving group. Kwak and Moon [30] proposed an efficient distributed signcryption
scheme and gave some heuristic arguments for security analysis of their scheme. Recently, Gupta and Saxena [31,32]
proposed a formal security model for distributed signcryption for confidentiality and unforgeability and a scheme for
distributed signcryption. Furthermore, they extended the distributed signcryption protocol to group signcryption. Libert
and Quisquater [21] proposed an efficient signcryption scheme with key privacy from gap Diffie–Hellman groups. Li
et al. [33] proposed a new identity-based signcryption scheme based on multiple private key generators, which was more
suitable for multi-domain ad hoc networks. In Crypto 2003, Boyen [16] proposed a comprehensive security model for
multipurpose identity-based encryption-signature cryptosystems and presented a new cryptographic scheme that precisely
implements all facets of the aforementioned notion of ‘‘secure signed communication’’ in the certificate-free world of
identity-based cryptography. Recently, several new kinds of signcryption are proposed. Zhang and Xu [34] proposed an
anonymous identity-based signcryption scheme for multiple receivers in the standard model. Selvi et al. [35] proposed
the first efficient certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme, which does not require pairing to signcrypt a message
for any number of receivers, and proved it secure in the random oracle model. They considered a more realistic adversarial
model and proved the security against insider attacks, which guarantees non-repudiation and forward secrecy. Liu et al. [36]
introduced a formal security model for certificateless signcryption schemes secure against the malicious-but-passive KGC
attacks and proposed a novel certificateless signcryption scheme. Li and Wong [37] proposed a new generic construction
for signcryption and showed that it was secure under the security models which were comparable to the security against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks for public key encryption and the existential unforgeability against chosen message
attacks for signatures. Li et al. [38,39] proposed an efficient signcryption scheme with key privacy that is proven secure
under the standard assumption of the gap Diffie–Hellman problem in the random oracle model. Their scheme achieved
confidentiality, existential unforgeability and anonymity with more precise reduction bounds. Furthermore, they gave a
variation of the proposed scheme and extended it to a ring signcryption scheme. Duan and Cao [18] proposed an efficient
multi-receiver identity based signcryption scheme which only needs one pairing computation to signcrypt a message
for n receivers and can provide confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously in a multi-receiver setting. Recently, Yu
et al. [40] gave a complete security model for identity based generalized signcryption. Furthermore, they proposed an
efficient identity based generalized signcryption scheme and proved their scheme was secure in the given security model.
However, no certificate-based signcryption schemes have been proposed until 2008. Luo et al. [9] proposed the security
notion of certificate-based signcryption and presented the first construction of certificate-based signcryption (hereinafter
referred to as the LWZ scheme). It is claimed that their scheme is publicly verifiable and provably secure in the random
oracle model.
Our contributions. In this paper, we first show that LWZ scheme is insecure by presenting two concrete attacks, namely
the LWZ scheme is ciphertext distinguishable under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and is existentially forgeable under
chosen message attacks. After that, we define an enhanced security model of certificate-based signcryption by integrating
the strong security model of certificate-based signatures defined in [6,11]. Furthermore, we also construct a new certificate-
based signcryption scheme which enjoys short signature length, low operation cost and provable security in the random
oracle model.
Organization of the paper. In the next section, we review some preliminaries required in this paper. We describe the
formal definition and the enhanced security model for certificate-based signcryption in Section 3. Section 4 presents two
concrete attacks on LWZ scheme. In Section 5, we propose a new certificate-based signcryption scheme, together with the
security proof in the random oracle and the performance analysis of the new scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
This section introduces the notation of bilinear mapping and some mathematical assumptions that are required to
understand the following sections.
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Let G1 be an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a multiplicative group of the same order. Let P be a generator of
G1. A bilinear mapping e : G1 × G1 → G2 has the following properties:
– The map is bilinear: e(aP, bQ ) = e(P,Q )ab for all P,Q ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Zq.
– The map is non-degenerate: e(P, P) ≠ 1G2 .
– The map is efficiently computable.
Definition 1 (DL Problem in G1). Given (P, aP) for some unknown a ∈ Z∗q , output a.
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time (denote as PPT) algorithm A in solving the DL problem in
G1 is defined to be
SuccDLA,G1 = Pr[A(P, aP) = a : a ∈ Z∗q ].
The DL assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccDLA,G1 is negligible.
Definition 2 (CDH Problem in G1). Given (P, aP, bP) for some unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute abP .
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA in solving the CDH problem in G1 is defined to
be
SuccCDHA,G1 = Pr[A(P, aP, bP) = abP : a, b ∈ Z∗q ].
The CDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccCDHA,G1 is negligible.
Definition 3 (DDH Problem in G2). Given (g, ga, gb) ∈ (G2)3 for some unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q and h ∈ G2, decide whether
h = gab or not.
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA in solving the DDH problem in G2 is defined to
be
SuccDDHA,G2 = |Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gab) = 1] − Pr[A(g, ga, gb, h) = 1]|.
The DDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccDDHA,G2 is negligible.
Definition 4 (GDH Problem in G2). Given (g, ga, gb) ∈ (G2)3 for some unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute gab with the help of
ODDH. ODDH is a DDH oracle that on input (g, ga, gb, h) ∈ (G2)4, outputs 1 if h = gab and 0 otherwise.
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA in solving the GDH problem in G2 is defined to
be
SuccGDHA,G2 = Pr[A(g, ga, gb,ODDH) = gab : a, b ∈ Z∗q ].
The GDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccGDHA,G2 is negligible.
Definition 5 (BDH Problem in ⟨G1,G2⟩). Given (P, aP, bP, cP) for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , compute e(P, P)abc .
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving the BDH problem in ⟨G1,G2⟩ is
defined to be
SuccBDHA,G1,G2 = Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP) = e(P, P)abc : a, b, c ∈ Z∗q ].
The BDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccBDHA,G1,G2 is negligible.
Definition 6 (DBDH Problem in ⟨G1,G2⟩). Given (P, aP, bP, cP) for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and T ∈ G2, decide whether
T = e(P, P)abc or not.
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving the DBDH problem in ⟨G1,G2⟩ is
defined to be
SuccDBDHA,G1,G2 = |Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP, e(P, P)abc) = 1] − Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP, T ) = 1]|.
The DBDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccDBDHA,G1,G2 is negligible.
Definition 7 (GBDH Problem in ⟨G1,G2⟩). Given (P, aP, bP, cP) for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , compute e(P, P)abc with the
help of ODBDH. ODBDH is a DBDH oracle that on input (aP, bP, cP, T ), outputs 1 if T = e(P, P)abc and 0 otherwise.
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving the GBDH problem in ⟨G1,G2⟩ is
defined to be
SuccGBDHA,G1,G2 = Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP,ODBDH) = e(P, P)abc : a, b, c ∈ Z∗q ].
The GBDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccGBDHA,G1,G2 is negligible.
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3. Certificate-based signcryption
In this section, we describe the formal definition and the enhanced security model of certificate-based signcryption.
3.1. Outline of certificate-based signcryption
Let A denotes the sender Alice, let B denotes the receiver Bob. A certificate-based signcryption scheme consists of the
following five algorithms:
– Setup: Take a security parameter k as input, the CA uses this algorithm to generate its master public/secret key pair
(PPub,Msk) and public parameter params.
– UserKeyGen: Take public parameter params and master public key PPub as input, a user U uses this algorithm to produce
its public/secret key pair (PKU , SKU).
– CertGen: Take public parameter params, master secret keyMsk, identity IDU and public key PKU of a user U as input, CA
computes the certificate for user U .
– Signcrypt: Sender Alice takes her certificate CertA, secret key SKA, a messagem, and the receiver’s public key PKB as input,
and runs this algorithm to output a signcryption σ .
– Designcrypt: When Bob receives σ , he runs this algorithm on the input of his certificate CertB, secret key SKB and obtains
the original messagem or the symbol⊥ if σ is an invalid signcryption between IDA and IDB.
3.2. Security models of certificate-based signcryption
Recently, Luo et al. [9] proposed a security model for certificate-based signcryption. Their model is a combination of
Malone–Lee’s security model [41] for identity-based signcryption and the security model of certificate-based signature of
Li et al. [7]. In this section, we provide an enhanced security model by incorporating the strong security requirements of
certificate-based signature in [6,11].
There are two types of adversaries (denote as AI and AII ), which simulate different attacking scenarios. AI models a
dishonest entity who does not know the master secret key, but can obtain any user’s secret key and replace any user’s
public key with his/her choice. In the game of confidentiality,AI is not allowed to query the certificates of the target sender
and the target receiver. In the game of unforgeability,AI is not allowed to query the target sender’s certificate.AII models a
malicious certifier with the master secret keyMsk. In the game of confidentiality,AII is not allowed to query the secret keys
or replace public keys of the target sender and the target receiver. In the game of unforgeability,AII is not allowed to query
the target sender’s secret key or replace the target sender’s public key.
Before presenting the details of the security definitions, we first define six oracleswhich can be accessed by the adversary
in our game-based model.
Public key: Challenger C keeps a list Lu = {(IDU , SKU , PKU , fU)} to record the secret/public keys of created users. Lu is empty
at the beginning of the game. Given a public key query for a new user IDU ,C runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to obtain a
secret/public key pair (SKU , PKU), adds (IDU , SKU , PKU , 0) into Lu and sends PKU to the adversary. Otherwise, IDU has been
created before and its public key is returned.
In the following oracles, the challenger C sets fU = 1 if the public key of user IDU has been replaced. Otherwise, fU = 0
(which is the initial value when IDU was created).
Public key replace: For a public key replace query (IDU , PK),C checks the list Lu. If IDU is already in Lu,C updates the
corresponding tuple with (IDU ,⊥, PK, 1). Otherwise, C adds (IDU ,⊥, PK, 1) into Lu. The symbol ‘‘⊥’’ indicates that C does
not know the corresponding private key.
Corruption: On a corruption query IDU ,C checks the list Lu. If IDU has not been created yet,C runs the UserKeyGen algorithm
to obtain a secret/public key pair (SKU , PKU), adds (IDU , SKU , PKU , 0) into Lu and sends SKU to the adversary. Otherwise, there
is a tuple in Lu that contains IDU and its secret key SKU is returned. Note that in this case SKU could be ‘‘⊥’’ if IDU ’s public
key has been replaced by the adversary.
CertGen: On a CertGen query IDU ,C checks the list Lu. If IDU is already in Lu,C runs the CertGen algorithm and returns
the certificate CertU . Otherwise, C runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to obtain a secret/public key pair (SKU , PKU) and adds
(IDU , SKU , PKU , 0) into Lu. After that, C runs the CertGen algorithm with input (IDU , PKU ,Msk, params) and returns the
certificate CertU .
Signcrypt: On a signcrypt query (m, IDA, IDB),C checks the list Lu for tuple (IDA, SKA, PKA, fA). If fA = 1 then it asks the
adversary to provide the secret key SKA of PKA. Otherwise, SKA in the tuple is a correct secret key of IDA. In both cases, C will
generate the certificate CertA of PKA and respond with a signcryption σ by running the signcrypt algorithmwith input CertA
and SKA.
Designcrypt: On a designcrypt query (σ , IDA, IDB),C checks the list Lu for tuple (IDB, SKB, PKB, fB). If fB = 1 then it asks the
adversary to supply the secret key SKB of PKB. Otherwise, SKB in the tuple is a correct secret key of IDB. In both cases, C will
generate the certificate CertB of PKB and run the designcrypt algorithm using CertB and SKB, whose output is given to the
adversary.
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The security of certificate-based signcryption is defined by the following four games between the adversary and the
challenger.
Game 1:
Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to generate master secret key Msk, master public key PPub and public
parameter params. C sends (PPub, params) toAI while keepingMsk secret.
Phase 1:AI can adaptively query all six oracles defined previously.
Challenge:AI outputs two equal lengthmessagesm0,m1 and selects two target identities ID∗A, ID
∗
B as the sender and receiver
respectively. The restriction is that during the Phase 1 AI does not make CertGen queries on ID∗A or ID
∗
B . If fA = 1, the
challenger C requires the adversary to supply the secret key corresponding to the current public key of ID∗A. After that, C
randomly chooses d∈R{0, 1}, computes σ ∗ = Signcrypt(md, Cert∗A, SK∗A, PK∗B) and sends σ ∗ to AI , where PK∗B might not be
the one generated by the challenger. (In other words, the public key of ID∗B may have been replaced by the adversary.)
Phase 2:AI continues to query the oracles as in Phase 1, but cannot make a designcrypt query on (σ ∗, ID∗A, ID
∗
B) or a CertGen
query on ID∗A or ID
∗
B .
Guess:AI outputs a bit d′.AI wins the game if d′ = d. The advantage ofAI is defined as AdvIND-CBSC-CCA2AI = |2Pr[d′ = d]−1|.
Definition 8 (Confidentiality Against AI ). A certificate-based signcryption scheme is said to be secure against adaptive
chosen ciphertext adversary AI (IND-CBSC-CCA2-I), if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can have non-negligible
advantage in winning the above game.
Game 2:
Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to generate master secret key Msk, master public key PPub and public
parameter params. C sends (PPub,Msk, params) toAII .
Phase 1: In this phase, AII can make requests to all oracles except CertGen oracle with Msk,AII does not need to make
CertGen queries.
Challenge:AII outputs two equal lengthmessagesm0,m1 and selects two target identities ID∗A, ID
∗
B as the sender and receiver
respectively. The restriction is that AII does not make corruption queries or public key replace queries on ID∗A, ID
∗
B . C
randomly chooses d∈R{0, 1}, computes σ ∗ = Signcrypt(md, Cert∗A, SK∗A, PK∗B), and sends σ ∗ toAII .
Phase 2: AII continues to query the oracles as in Phase 1 but is not allowed to make designcrypt query on (σ ∗, ID∗A, ID
∗
B),
corruption queries or public key replace queries on ID∗A or ID
∗
B .
Guess:AII outputs a bit d′.AII wins the game if d′ = d. The advantage ofAII is defined as AdvIND-CBSC-CCA2AII = |2P[d′ = d]−1|.
Definition 9 (Confidentiality Against AII ). A certificate-based signcryption scheme is said to be secure against adaptive
chosen ciphertext adversaryAII (IND-CBSC-CCA2-II), if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can have non-negligible
advantage in winning the above game.
Game 3:
Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to generate master secret key Msk, master public key PPub and public
parameter params. C sends (PPub, params) toAI while keepingMsk secret.
Query:AI can adaptively query all six oracles defined previously.
Forgery:AI outputs σ ∗ as the signcryption of (ID∗A, ID
∗
B).AI wins if
– Designcrypt(σ ∗, SK∗B, Cert
∗
B, PK
∗
A) ≠ ⊥, where PK∗A is the current public key of ID∗A and may not be the one generated by
the challenger. Similarly, SK∗B could also differ from the one generated by the challenger.
– σ ∗ is not the output of the signcrypt oracle by taking (m∗, ID∗A, ID
∗
B) as the input.
– ID∗A has never been queried to CertGen oracle.
Definition 10 (Unforgeability AgainstAI ).A certificate-based signcryption scheme is said to be unforgeable against adaptive
chosen message adversary AI (EUF-CBSC-CMA-I), if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can have non-negligible
advantage in winning the above game.
Game 4:
Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to generate master secret key Msk, master public key PPub and public
parameter params. It sends (PPub,Msk, params) toAII .
Query: Similar to Game 2,AII can adaptively make requests to all oracles except CertGen.
Forgery:AII outputs σ ∗ as the signcryption of (ID∗A, ID
∗
B).AII wins if
– Designcrypt(σ ∗, SK∗B, Cert
∗
B, PK
∗
A) ≠ ⊥ is a messagem∗, where PK∗A is the original public key generated by the challenger.
As in Game 3, SK∗B could differ from the one generated by the challenger.
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– σ ∗ is not the output from the signcrypt oracle by taking (m∗, ID∗A, ID
∗
B) as the input.
– ID∗A has never been queried to corruption oracle.
Definition 11 (Unforgeability AgainstAII ).A certificate-based signcryption scheme is said to be unforgeable against adaptive
chosen message adversaryAII (EUF-CBSC-CMA-II), if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can have a non-negligible
advantage in winning the above game.
Remark 1. Our securitymodel is similar to the one defined in [9] butwith two improvements. Firstly, we define a public key
replace oracle which allows the adversary to replace any user’s public key. Although this is the essence of a Type I adversary
in certificate-based cryptography, the adversary defined in [9] does not allow the adversary to replace any user’s public key.
The other improvement in our model is that we loose the restriction condition in Definition 5 in [9], namely the adversary
can replace the public key PK∗A with a value of his choice in Game 3 of our security model.
4. Analysis of LWZ certificate-based signcryption scheme
In this section, we show that the LWZ certificate-based signcryption scheme is insecure by two concrete attacks. In order
to describe our attacks, we first review the LWZ scheme.
4.1. Review of LWZ certificate-based signcryption scheme
The scheme consists of the following six algorithms: Setup: Given a security parameter k, the algorithmworks as follows:
– Let G1,G2 be groups of a prime order p in which there exists a bilinear map e from G1 × G1 to G2.
– Select a randomnumber s ∈ Z∗q as themaster secret key, choose an arbitrary generator of P ∈ G1 and compute themaster
public key Ppub = sP .
– Choose four cryptographic hash functionsH1 : {0, 1}n×G1 → G1,H2 : {0, 1}n×G1×G1 → G1,H3 : G1×G1×{0, 1}n →
Z∗q and H4 : G2 → {0, 1}n. The system parameters are params = ⟨G1,G2, e, P, Ppub,H1,H2,H3,H4⟩.
UserKeyGen: Given params, select a random number sU ∈ Z∗q as the user secret key and compute the user public key
PKU = sUP ∈ G1. Suppose that Alice gets her public/secret key pair (PKA = sAP, sA) and Bob gets his public/secret key
pair (PKB = sBP, sB).
CertGen: Given params, master secret key s, user public key PKU and user identity IDU ∈ {0, 1}n, compute QU = H1(IDU ∥
PKU) ∈ G1 and output a certificate CertU = sQU ∈ G1. We define Alice’s certificate as CertA = sQA = sH1(IDA ∥ PKA) and
Bob’s certificate as CertB = sQB = sH1(IDB ∥ PKB).
Sender signcrypt: To send a messagem to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
– Choose x ∈ Z∗q and compute R = xP and S = H2(IDA, PKA, R).
– Compute h = H3(R, S,m) and V = x−1(CertA + sAS + hPpub).
– ComputeW = e(PKA, PKB)x.
– Compute c = H4(W )⊕m.
The ciphertext is σ = (c, R, V ).
Receiver decrypt: When receiving σ = (c, R, V ), Bob follows the steps below to decrypt the ciphertext.
– ComputeW ′ = e(R, sBPKA).
– Recoverm′ = c ⊕ H4(W ′).
Forward messagem′ and signature (R, V ) to receiver.
Receiver verify: To verify Alice’s signature (R, V ) on messagemwhere Alice has identity IDA:
– Compute S ′ = H2(IDA, PKA, R) and h′ = H3(R, S ′,m′).
– Accept the message if and only if the following equation holds:
e(R, V ) = e(Ppub,QA)e(PKA, S ′)e(P, Ppub)h′ .
4.2. Attack on the LWZ scheme’s confidentiality
During the challenge phase of the confidentiality proofs, the challenger C receives two messages m0 and m1 from the
adversary. The challenger randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} to compute σ ∗ = (c∗, R∗, V ∗) and sends it to the adversary. After
receiving σ ∗ = (c∗, R∗, V ∗), the adversary can distinguish whether it is the signcryption of message m0 or message m1 by
doing the following steps:
– Compute S = H2(IDA, PKA, R∗).
– Compute h = H3(R∗, S,m0), then it can computewhether e(R∗, V ∗) = e(Ppub,QA)e(PKA, S)e(P, Ppub)h holds. If this holds,
then it knowsm0 is the plaintext of σ ∗.
– Otherwise, it knowsm1 is the plaintext of σ ∗.
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Thus,without any interactionwith the challengerC after receiving the challenge ciphertext, the adversary candistinguish
whether σ ∗ is the signcryption of messagem0 orm1.
4.3. Attack on the LWZ scheme’s unforgeability
In this subsection, we show that the scheme is forgeable under a chosen message attack by a dishonest receiver Bob. The
attack is as follows:
– Bob randomly chooses x′ ∈ Z∗q , y ∈ Z∗q , computes R′ = x′Ppub.
– Set PK′A = yPpub as the public key of user Alice.
– Compute S ′ = H2(IDA, PK′A, R′).
– Randomly select a messagem, compute h′ = H3(R′, S ′,m).
– SetW ′ = e(R′, sBPK′A), compute c ′ = H4(W ′)⊕m.
– Compute QA = H1(IDA ∥ PK′A), V ′ = x′−1(QA + yS ′ + h′P).
The forged signcryption on messagem under the public key PK′A = yPpub of user Alice is σ = (c ′, R′, V ′).
A third partywill believe that the signcryptionσ = (c ′, R′, V ′) onmessagem is really signcrypted by Alice to Bob, because
(m, R′, V ′) satisfies the verification equation.
e(Ppub,QA)e(PK′A, S
′)e(P, Ppub)h
′ = e(Ppub,QA)e(yPpub, S ′)e(h′P, Ppub)
= e(Ppub,QA + yS ′ + h′P)
= e(x′Ppub, x′−1(QA + yS ′ + h′P))
= e(R′, V ′).
Thus, a dishonest receiver can forge a valid signcryption on arbitrary messages.
5. A new certificate-based signcryption scheme
Our scheme consists of the following five concrete algorithms:
Setup: The system’s security parameter is k. Let G1 be an additive group with prime order q and G2 be a multiplicative
group with the same order, where there exists an admissible bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Let P be an arbitrary
generator of G1. Select a random number s ∈ Z∗q as the master secret key, compute the master public key Ppub = sP .
Choose three cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}n × G2 → G1,H2 : G1 × G2 × G2 → {0, 1}n,H3 : {0, 1}n ×
G2 × G2 → Z∗q and a secure symmetric encryption scheme (E,D). Set g = e(P, P) ∈ G2. The system parameters are
params = ⟨G1,G2, e, q, P, Ppub, g,H1,H2,H3, E,D⟩.
UserKeyGen: Given params, a user IDU selects a random number sU ∈ Z∗q as his secret key and computes the public key
PKU = g sU = e(P, P)sU ∈ G2.
CertGen: Given params, the master secret key s, a user public key PKU and an identity IDU ∈ {0, 1}n, the CA computes
QU = H1(IDU ∥ PKU) ∈ G1 and outputs the certificate CertU = sQU ∈ G1.
Signcrypt: To generate a signcryption on a message m with the receiver Bob, Alice randomly selects r1, r2 ∈ Z∗q , computes
p1 = e(P, Ppub)r1 , p2 = g r2 , R = r1QA, T = e(CertA,QB)r1 ,U = PKBsA , K = H2(R, T ,U), c = EK (m), h = H3(c, p1, p2) and
V = r1Ppub − hCertA, v = r2 − sAh. Alice sends Bob σ = (c, h, V , v, R), which is the signcryption ofm.
Designcrypt: Upon receiving σ = (c, h, V , v, R), Bob computes T ′ = e(R, CertB),U ′ = PKsBA , K ′ = H2(R, T ′,U ′), p′1 =
e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p′2 = gvPKhA, recoversm′ = DK ′(c) and accepts σ if and only if h = H3(c, p′1, p′2).
The correctness of our scheme is satisfied due to the following equations:
p′1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h = e(P, r1Ppub − hCertA)e(sP, hQA) = e(P, r1Ppub) = p1;
p′2 = gvPKhA = g r2−sAhg sAh = g r2 = p2;
T ′ = e(R, CertB) = e(r1QA, sQB) = e(CertA,QB)r1 = T ;
U ′ = PKAsB = e(P, P)sAsB = PKBsA = U; and
K ′ = H2(R, T ′,U ′) = K .
Therefore, we have h′ = H3(c, p′1, p′2) = h andm′ = DK ′(c) = m.
Remark 2. Any third party can be convinced of the validity of a signcryption by calculating p′1, p
′
2 and verifying if h =
H3(c, p′1, p
′
2). In other words, one can verify the validity of a signcryption without the receiver’s private key. This we believe
is another improvement over [9].
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5.1. Security
Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, if there exists a polynomial-time IND-CBSC-CCA2 adversary AI who can win
Game 1 with an advantage ε, by making at most qHi queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), qPK public key queries, qR public key
replace queries, qK corruption queries, qC CertGen queries, qS signcrypt queries and qD designcrypt queries, then there exists a PPT
algorithmB which can solve the Gap-BDH problem with an advantage at least
(1/e2) · 1
q2H1
·

ε + 1
2
− 1
2k
− υ

.
Here, e is the base of natural logarithm, k is system’s security parameter and υ denotes the probability that an attacker can break
the IND-CCA security of the symmetric encryption scheme (E,D).
Proof. Let P be the generator of G1. AlgorithmB is given a random instance of the Gap-BDH problem (P, aP, bP, cP,ODBDH),
where ODBDH is a DBDH oracle. B’s goal is to output e(P, P)abc . Algorithm B will run AI as a subroutine and act as AI ’s
challenger. B needs to maintain four lists L1, L2, L3, Lu which are initially empty. Lists L1, L2, L3 are used to keep track of
answers to queries made by AI to oracles H1,H2,H3, and the list Lu will be used to keep track of answers to public key
queries and public key replace queries. We assume that any H1 query on an identity ID happens afterAI ’s public key query
on ID. We also assume that any CertGen queries, signcrypt queries or designcrypt queries on ID will only occur afterAI asks
the hashing H1 of ID.
Setup.B sets Ppub = aP as the master public key and g = e(P, P), and sends them toAI .
Phase 1.B interacts withAI as follows.
Public key queries. For a public key query on IDU ,B searches a tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , •) in the list Lu. If the tuple exists B
answers with PKU . OtherwiseB randomly chooses sU ∈ Z∗q , returns PKU = g sU , and adds a new tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , 0) into
list Lu.
H1 queries.AI asks atmost qH1 queries on identities of his choice.B chooses twodistinct randomnumbers i, j ∈

1, . . . , qH1

.
For the ith request, B responds with H1(IDi, PKi) = bP and puts (IDi, PKi,⊥) into list L1. For the jth request, B responds
with H1(IDj, PKj) = cP and puts (IDj, PKj,⊥) into list L1. For other requests IDU ∉ {IDi, IDj},B chooses bu ∈ Z∗q , puts
(IDU , PKU , bu) into list L1 and responds with H1(IDU , PKU) = buP .
Public key replace queries. AI makes a public key replace query on (IDU , PK). B searches a tuple (IDU , •, PKU , •) in the list
Lu. If the tuple is not found,B first generates the public key of IDU as he does in answering public key queries. Now there is
a tuple (IDU , •, PKU , •) in Lu.B then replaces (IDU , •, PKU , •)with (IDU , •, PK, 1).
H2 queries. On a query H2(R, T ,U),B searches a tuple (R, •,U, K) in the list L2.
(1) If the tuple has the form (R, T ,U, K),B sends K to the adversary.
(2) Else, if the tuple has the form (R,⊥,U, K),B sends (P, R, cP, Ppub, T ) to ODBDH. If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’, B sends K to
the adversary and replaces (R,⊥,U, K)with (R, T ,U, K).
(3) Otherwise,B responds with a randomly chosen string K ∈ {0, 1}n and adds (R, T ,U, K) into list L2.
H3 queries. On a query H3(c, p1, p2),B searches a tuple (c, p1, p2, h) in the list L3. If the tuple is found B responds with h.
OtherwiseB returns a random h ∈ Z∗q and adds (c, p1, p2, h) into list L3.
Corruption queries. For a corruption query on IDU ,B searches a tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , •) in the list Lu. If the tuple is found B
responds with sU . Otherwise it runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to obtain (sU , PKU), adds (IDU , sU , PKU , 0) into list Lu and
responds with sU .
CertGen queries. For a CertGen query on IDU , let PKU be the public key of IDU in the list Lu.B aborts if H1(IDU , PKU) = bP or
H1(IDU , PKU) = cP . Otherwise,B retrieves the tuple (IDU , PKU , bu) from L1 and responds with CertU = abuP = buPpub.
Signcrypt queries. We now show howB can answer a signcrypt query (m, IDA, IDB). Let PKA and PKB be the public keys of IDA
and IDB respectively. Note that if fA = 1, the public key of IDA has been replaced andAI needs to provide the corresponding
secret key sA. There are three possible cases:
(1) If (IDA, PKA) is not the ith or jth H1 query,B can calculate the certificate CertA of (IDA, PKA) by making a CertGen query.
After that,B responds with the output of Signcrypt(m, sA, CertA, PKB).
(2) Else, if (IDB, PKB) is not the ith or jth H1 queries,B can generate a correct answer as follows. In this case,B can calculate
the certificate CertB of (IDB, PKB). B then chooses V ∈ G1, r1, r2, h ∈ Z∗q , computes R = r1QA, T = e(R, CertB),U =
PKBsA , v = r2 − sAh. After that, B runs the H2 simulation to find K = H2(R, T ,U) and computes c = EK (m). It then
computes p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = g r2 . If L3 already contains a tuple (c, p1, p2, h′)with h′ ≠ h, thenB repeats the
process with another choice of (V , r1, r2, h) until finding a tuple (c, p1, p2, h)whose first two elements do not appear in
a tuple of the list L3. Once an admissible tuple (c, p1, p2, h) is found,B adds it on L3 and responds with a valid ciphertext
(c, h, V , v, R).
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(3) Otherwise (IDA, IDB) = (IDi, IDj). In this case B chooses V ∈ G1, r1, r2, h ∈ Z∗q , and computes R = r1QA,U = PKAsB . B
then tries to search a tuple (R, •,U, K) in the list L2.
• If the tuple is found and has the form (R, T ,U, K),B sends (P, R, cP, Ppub, T ) to ODBDH. If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’, B will
use K as the encryption key.
• Else, if the tuple is found and has the form (R,⊥,U, K),B will use K as the encryption key.
• Otherwise,B randomly chooses K ∈ {0, 1}n and adds (R,⊥,U, K) on L2.
In all three cases, B computes c = EK (m), p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = g r2 and v = r2 − sAh, and checks if L3 already
contains a tuple (c, p1, p2, h′) with h′ ≠ h. If the tuple does not exist, B adds (c, p1, p2, h) to L3. Otherwise, it repeats the
process with another choice of (V , r1, r2, h) until finding a tuple (c, p1, h)whose first two elements do not appear in a tuple
of the list L3. Once an admissible tuple (c, p1, p2, h) is found,B responds with a valid signcryption (c, h, V , v, R).
Designcrypt queries. We now show how B can correctly decrypt a signcryption (σ = (c, h, V , v, R), IDA, IDB). Let PKA and
PKB be the public keys of IDA and IDB respectively. If fB = 1,AI needs to provide the corresponding secret key sB.
(1) If (IDB, PKB) is not the ith or jthH1 queries,B can calculate the certificate of (IDB, PKB) and perform a normal decryption
using the corresponding certificate and secret key.
(2) Otherwise,B computes p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = gvPKhA. If h ≠ H3(c, p1, p2), then σ is invalid and an error symbol⊥ is returned to the adversary. If the equation is satisfied, B computes U = PKAsB and searches a tuple (R, •,U, K) in
the list L2.
• If the tuple has the form (R,⊥,U, K),B will use K to decrypt c and sends the result to the adversary.
• Else, if the tuple has the form (R, T ,U, K).B sends (R, cP, Ppub, T ) to ODBDH. If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’,B will use K to
decrypt c and sends the result to the adversary.
• Otherwise,B randomly chooses K ∈ {0, 1}n and adds (R,⊥,U, K) into L2,B then uses K to decrypt c and sends the
result to the adversary.
Challenge.AI produces two plaintextsm0,m1, and chooses a pair of identities (ID∗A, ID
∗
B) on which it wishes to challenge. Let
PK∗A and PK
∗
B be the public keys of ID
∗
A and ID
∗
B respectively. B aborts if (ID
∗
A, PK
∗
A) and (ID
∗
B, PK
∗
B) are not the ith and jth H1
queries. Otherwise, B randomly chooses d ∈ {0, 1}, V ∗ ∈ G1, h∗, r∗1 , r∗2 ∈ Z∗q , computes p∗1 = e(P, V ∗)e(Ppub, bp)h∗ , p∗2 =
g r
∗
2 , v∗ = r∗2 − s∗Ah∗, R∗ = r∗1 bP,U∗ = (PK∗B)s∗A . Recall that if fA = 1, the adversary must provide the secret key s∗A. B
then searches a tuple (R∗, •,U∗, K ∗) in the list L2. If such a tuple is found,B repeats the above process until the list L2 does
not have the tuple (R∗, •,U∗, K ∗). B then randomly chooses K ∗ ∈ {0, 1}n and adds (R∗,⊥,U∗, K ∗) into L2. After that, B
computes c∗ = EK∗(md) and checks if L3 already contains a tuple (c∗, p∗1, p∗2, h′) with h′ ≠ h∗. If the tuple is not found, B
adds (c∗, p∗1, p
∗
2, h
∗) into L3. Otherwise, it repeats the process with another choice of (V ∗, h∗, r∗1 , r
∗
2 ) until finding a tuple
(c∗, p∗1, p
∗
2, h
∗) whose first two elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L3. Once an admissible tuple (c∗, p∗1, p
∗
2, h
∗) is
found, it sends the ciphertext (c∗, h∗, V ∗, v∗, R∗) toAI .
Phase 2.AI can continuemaking queries which are treated in the sameway as in Phase 1. Note that, it is not allowed tomake
CertGen queries on IDi or IDj, or a designcrypt query on (σ ∗ = (c∗, h∗, V ∗, v∗, R∗), IDi, IDj).
Guess.AI produces a bit d′. If d′ = d thenAI wins the game, whose advantage is defined as ε = |2Pr[d′ = d] − 1|.
We first consider the probability thatB does not abort during the simulation.
E1 :AI does not make certificate queries on (ID∗A, PK
∗
A) or (ID
∗
B, PK
∗
B).
E2 : At the challenge phase,AI chooses (ID∗A, ID
∗
B) as the challenge pair and their public keys are PK
∗
A and PK
∗
B , respectively.
Therefore the probability thatB does not abort is
Pr[E1 ∧ E2] >

1− 2
qH1
qC
· 1 qH1
2
 > (1/e2) · 1
q2H1
.
Here, e is the base of natural logarithm. Since the hash function H2 is simulated as a random oracle, with probability at
least ‘‘(ε + 1)/2− 1/2k − υ ’’AI must have sent a request (R∗, T ∗,U∗, K ∗) to H2 oracle and (R∗, cP, Ppub, T ∗) is a valid BDH
tuple (i.e., e(P, P)abc = (T ∗)(r∗1 )−1 ). Here, υ denotes the probability that an attacker can break the IND-CCA security of the
symmetric encryption scheme (E,D).
Thus, the probability thatB can output a correct answer is at least
(1/e2) · 1
q2H1
·

ε + 1
2
− 1
2k
− υ

. 
Theorem 2. In the random oracle model, if there exists a polynomial-time IND-CBSC-CCA2 adversary AII who can win
Game 2 with an advantage ε, by making at most qHi queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), qPK public key queries, qR public key
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replace queries, qK Corruption queries, qS signcrypt queries and qD designcrypt queries, then there exists a PPT algorithmB which
can solve the GDH problem with an advantage at least
(1/e2) · 1
q2PK
·

ε + 1
2
− 1
2k
− υ

.
Here, e is the base of natural logarithm, k is system’s security parameter and υ denotes the probability that an attacker can break
the IND-CCA security of the symmetric encryption scheme (E,D).
Proof. Let P be the generator of G1 and g = e(P, P) ∈ G2. Algorithm B is given a random instance of the GDH problem
(g, ga, gb,ODDH) where ODDH is a DDH oracle.B’s goal is to output gab. AlgorithmB will runAII as a subroutine and act as
AII ’s challenger. B needs to maintain four lists L1, L2, L3, Lu which are initially empty. The lists L1, L2, L3 are used to keep
track of answers to queries made byAII to oracles H1,H2,H3, and the list Lu is used to keep track of answers to public key
queries and public key replace queries. We assume that any H1 query on an identity ID happens afterAI ’s public key query
on ID. We also assume that any signcrypt queries or designcrypt queries on ID will only occur afterAII asks the hashing H1
of ID.
Setup. B randomly chooses s ∈ Z∗q as the master secret key, computes Ppub = sP as the master public key and sends them
toAII .
Phase 1.B interacts withAII as follows.
Public key queries. AII can make at most qPK queries on identities of his choice. At the beginning, B chooses two distinct
random numbers i, j ∈ {1, . . . , qPK}. For the ith request,B responds with PKi = ga and adds (IDi,⊥, PKi, 0) into list Lu. For
the jth request, B responds with PKj = gb and adds (IDj,⊥, PKj, 0) into list Lu. For a query IDU ∉ {IDi, IDj},B searches a
tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , •) in the list Lu. If such a tuple is foundB responds with PKU . OtherwiseB randomly chooses sU ∈ Z∗q ,
sends PKU = g sU toAII , and adds a new tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , 0) into list Lu.
H1 queries. On a query (IDU , PKU),B searches a triple (IDU , PKU , bu) in the list Lu. If such a triple is foundB responds with
H1(IDU , PKU) = buP . OtherwiseB randomly chooses bu ∈ Z∗q , sets H1(IDU , PKU) = buP and adds (IDU , PKU , bu) into list L1.
buP is sent toAII as the answer of H1(IDU , PKU).
Public key replace queries. Given a public key replace query (IDU , PK),B aborts if IDU ∈ {IDi, IDj}. For any other queries,
B searches a tuple (IDU , •, PKU , •) in the list Lu. If no such tuple is found B adds (IDU ,⊥, PK, 1) into list Lu. Otherwise, B
replaces the tuple with (IDU ,⊥, PK, 1).
H2 queries. On a query H2(R, T ,U),B searches list L2.
• If there is a tuple (R, T ,U, K , •, •) in L2,B sends K to the adversary.
• Else, if there is a tuple (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) in L2,B sends (g, PKA, PKB,U) to ODDH. If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’,B sends K
to the adversary and replaces (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB)with (R, T ,U, K , PKA, PKB).
• Otherwise,B responds with a randomly chosen string K ∈ {0, 1}n and adds (R, T ,U, K , •, •) into list L2.
H3 queries. On a query H3(c, p1, p2),B searches a tuple (c, p1, p2, h) in the list L3. If such a tuple is found B responds with
h, otherwiseB returns a random h ∈ Z∗q and adds (c, p1, p2, h) into list L3.
Corruption queries. For a corruption query IDU ,B aborts if IDU ∈ {IDi, IDj}. Else, if IDU ∉ {IDi, IDj} and there is a tuple
(IDU , sU , PKU , •) in the list Lu,B responds with sU . OtherwiseB runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to generate (sU , PKU), adds
(IDU , sU , PKU , 0) into list Lu and responds with sU .
Signcrypt queries. We now show howB can answer a signcrypt query (m, IDA, IDB). Let PKA and PKB be the public keys of IDA
and IDB respectively. Note that, if fA = 1, the public key of IDA has been replaced andAII needs to provide the corresponding
secret key sA. There are two possible cases:
(1) If IDA is not the ith or jth public key query,B responds with the output of Signcrypt(m, sA, CertA, PKB).
(2) Otherwise,B can generate a correct answer as follows.B first chooses V ∈ G1, r1, h, v ∈ Z∗q , computes R = r1QA, T =
e(R, CertB). After that, B chooses a random K ∈ {0, 1}n, adds (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) into the list L2 and computes
c = EK (m). It then computes p2 = gvPKhA and p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h. If L3 already contains a tuple (c, p1, p2, h′)
with h′ ≠ h,B repeats the process with another choice of (V , r1, v, h) until finding a tuple (c, p1, p2, h)whose first two
elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L3. Once an admissible tuple (c, p1, p2, h) is found, B adds it into L3, and
responds with a valid ciphertext (c, h, V , v, R).
Designcrypt queries. We now show how B can correctly decrypt a signcryption (σ = (c, h, V , v, R), IDA, IDB). Let PKA and
PKB be the public keys of IDA and IDB respectively. If fB = 1,AII needs to provide the corresponding secret key sB.
(1) If IDB is not the ith or jth public key query,B can perform a normal decryption using the corresponding certificate and
secret key sB.
(2) Otherwise, B computes p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = gvPKhA. If h ≠ H3(c, p1, p2), then σ is invalid and an error
symbol⊥ is returned to the adversary. Otherwise, it computes T = e(R, CertB) and searches a tuple (R, T , •, K , •, •) in
the list L2.
J. Li et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 64 (2012) 1587–1601 1597
• If the tuple has the form (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) or (R, T ,U, K , PKA, PKB),B computes m = DK (c) and sends m to the
adversary.
• Otherwise, the tuple has the form (R, T ,U, K , •, •).B sends (g, PKA, PKB,U) to ODDH.
If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’, B replaces (R, T ,U, K , •, •) with (R, T ,U, K , PKA, PKB) and sends m = DK (c) to the
adversary.
Otherwise, B chooses a random string K ∈ {0, 1}n, adds (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) into list L2, and sends m = DK (c) to
the adversary.
Challenge. AII produces two plaintexts m0,m1, and chooses a pair of identities (ID∗A, ID
∗
B) on which it wishes to challenge.
Let PK∗A and PK
∗
B be the public keys of ID
∗
A and ID
∗
B respectively. B aborts if {ID∗A, ID∗B} ≠ {IDi, IDj}. Otherwise, B randomly
chooses d ∈ {0, 1}, V ∗ ∈ G1, h∗, r∗1 , v∗ ∈ Z∗q , computes p∗1 = e(P, V ∗)e(Ppub,QA)h∗ , p∗2 = gv∗PKh
∗
A , R
∗ = r∗1QA, T ∗ =
e(R∗, CertB). It searches a tuple (R∗, T ∗, •, •, •, ) in the list L2. If such a tuple is found, B repeats the above process with
a different r∗1 ∈ Z∗q until no tuples in L2 have the form (R∗, T ∗, •, •, •, •). B then randomly chooses K ∗ ∈ {0, 1}n and
adds (R∗, T ∗,⊥, K ∗, PK∗A, PK∗B) into L2. After that, B computes c∗ = EK∗(md) and checks if L3 already contains a tuple
(c∗, p∗1, p
∗
2, h
′) with h′ ≠ h∗. If the tuple is not found, B adds (c∗, p∗1, p∗2, h∗) into L3. Otherwise, it repeats the process with
another choice of (V ∗, h∗, r∗1 , v∗) until finding a tuple (c∗, p
∗
1, p
∗
2, h
∗) whose first two elements do not appear in a tuple of
the list L3. Once an admissible tuple (c∗, p∗1, p
∗
2, h
∗) is found, it sends the ciphertext (c∗, h∗, V ∗, v∗, R∗) toAII .
Phase 2. AII can continue making queries which are treated in the same way as in Phase 1. These queries must satisfy the
restrictions in Game 2 of Definition 9.
Guess.AII produces a bit d′. If d′ = d thenAII wins the game, whose advantage is defined as ε = |2Pr[d′ = d] − 1|.
We first consider the probability thatB does not abort during the simulation.
E1 :AII does not make corruption queries on ID∗A or ID
∗
B .
E2 : At the challenge phase, {ID∗A, ID∗B} = {IDi, IDj}.
Therefore the probability thatB does not abort is
Pr[E1 ∧ E2] >

1− 2
qPK
qK
• 1 qPK
2
 > (1/e2) · 1
q2PK
.
Here, e is the base of natural logarithm. Since the hash function H2 is simulated as a random oracle, with probability at least
‘‘(ε+1)/2−1/2k−υ ’’AII must have sent a request (R∗, T ∗,U∗) to H2 oracle and (g, PK∗A, PK∗B,U∗) is a valid CDH tuple (i.e.,
U∗ = gab). Here, υ denotes the probability that an attacker can break the IND-CCA security of the symmetric encryption
scheme (E,D).
Thus, the probability thatB can output a correct answer is at least
(1/e2) · 1
q2PK
·

ε + 1
2
− 1
2k
− υ

. 
Theorem 3. In the random oracle model, if there exists an EUF-CBSC-CMA adversaryAI who can win Game 3with an advantage
ε in polynomial time t, by making at most qHi queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), qPK public key queries, qR public key replace
queries, qK corruption queries, qC CertGen queries, qS signcrypt queries and qD designcrypt queries. Then there exists an algorithm
B which can solve the Gap-BDH problem with an advantage at least (1/e) · 19qH1 (qS+1) in time e ·
23qH1 qH3 t
ε
. Here, e is the base of
natural logarithm.
Proof. Let P be the generator of G1. AlgorithmB is given a random instance of the Gap-BDH problem (P, aP, bP, cP,ODBDH),
where ODBDH is a DBDH oracle. B’s goal is to output e(P, P)abc . Algorithm B will run AI as a subroutine and act as AI ’s
challenger. B needs to maintain four lists L1, L2, L3, Lu which are initially empty. The lists L1, L2, L3 are used to keep track
of answers to queries asked by AI to oracles H1,H2,H3. The list Lu is used to keep track of answers to public key queries
and public key replace queries. We assume that any H1 query on an identity ID happens after AI ’s public key query on ID.
We also assume that any CertGen queries, signcrypt queries or designcrypt queries on ID will only occur after AI asks the
hashing H1 of ID.
Setup.B sets Ppub = aP as the master public key and g = e(P, P), and sends them toAI .
Query.B interacts withAI as follows.
Public key queries. For a public key query on IDU ,B searches a tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , •) in the list Lu. If the tuple exists B
answers with PKU . OtherwiseB randomly chooses sU ∈ Z∗q , sends PKU = g sU toAI , and adds a new tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , 0)
into list Lu.
H1 queries.AI asks at most qH1 queries on identities of his choice.B randomly chooses i ∈

1, . . . , qH1

. At the ith request,
B responds with H1(IDi, PKi) = bP and adds (IDi, PKi,⊥) into list L1. For requests on IDU ≠ IDi,B chooses bu ∈ Z∗q , adds
(IDU , PKU , bu) into list L1 and responds with H1(IDU , PKU) = buP .
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Public key replace queries. For a public key replace query on (IDU , PK),B searches a tuple (IDU , •, PKU , •) in the list Lu. If no
such tuple is foundB adds (IDU ,⊥, PK, 1) into list Lu, else he replaces the tuple with (IDU ,⊥, PK, 1).
H2 queries. On a query H2(R, T ,U),B searches list L2.
• If there is a tuple (R, T ,U, K , •) in L2,B responds with K .
• Else, if there is a tuple (R,⊥,U, K ,QB) in L2,B sends (P, Ppub, R,QB, T ) to ODBDH. If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’, B replaces
(R,⊥,U, K ,QB)with (R, T ,U, K ,QB) and responds with K .
• Otherwise,B responds with a randomly chosen string K ∈ {0, 1}n and adds (R, T ,U, K , •) into list L2.
H3 queries. On a query H3(c, p1, p2),B searches a tuple (c, p1, p2, h) in the list L3. If the tuple is found B responds with h.
OtherwiseB returns a random h ∈ Z∗q and adds (c, p1, p2, h) into list L3.
Corruption queries. For a corruption query on IDU ,B searches a tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , •) in the list Lu. If the tuple is found B
responds with sU . Otherwise it runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to obtain (sU , PKU), adds (IDU , sU , PKU , 0) into list Lu and
responds with sU .
CertGen queries. For a CertGen query on IDU , let PKU be the public key of IDU in the list Lu.B will abort if H1(IDU , PKU) = bP .
Otherwise,B retrieves the tuple (IDU , PKU , bu) from L1 and responds with CertU = abuP = buPpub.
Signcrypt queries. We now show how B can answer a signcryption query (m, IDA, IDB). Let PKA and PKB be the public keys
of IDA and IDB respectively. Note that if fA = 1 the public key of IDA has been replaced and AI needs to provide the
corresponding secret key sA. There are two possible cases:
(1) If (IDA, PKA) is not the ith H1 query,B can compute the certificate CertA of (IDA, PKA) by making a CertGen query. After
that,B responds with the output of Signcrypt(m, sA, CertA, PKB).
(2) Otherwise B generates the response as follows. It chooses V ∈ G1, r1, r2, h ∈ Z∗q , computes R = r1QA, T =
e(R, CertB),U = PKBsA , v = r2 − sAh. After that, B runs the H2 simulation to find K = H2(R, T ,U) and computes
c = EK (m). It then computes p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = g r2 . If L3 already contains a tuple (c, p1, p2, h′) with
h′ ≠ h, then B repeats the process with another choice of (V , r1, r2, h) until finding a tuple (c, p1, p2, h) whose first
two elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L3. Once an admissible tuple (c, p1, p2, h) is found,B adds it on L3 and
responds with a valid ciphertext (c, h, V , v, R).
Designcrypt queries. We now show how B can correctly decrypt a signcryption (σ = (c, h, V , v, R), IDA, IDB). Let PKA and
PKB be the public keys of IDA and IDB respectively. If fB = 1,AI needs to provide the corresponding secret key.
(1) If (IDB, PKB) is not the ith H1 query,B can calculate the certificate of (IDB, PKB) and perform a normal decryption using
the corresponding certificate and secret key.
(2) Otherwise,B computes p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = gvPKhA. If h ≠ H3(c, p1, p2), then σ is invalid and an error symbol⊥ is returned toAI . Otherwise, it computes U = PKAsB and
• If there is tuple (R,⊥,U, K ,QB) in L2,B responds withm = DK (c).
• Else, if there is tuple (R, T ,U, K , •) in L2,B sends (P, Ppub, R,QB, T ) to ODBDH. If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’, B replaces
(R, T ,U, K , •)with (R, T ,U, K ,QB) and sendsm = DK (c) to the adversary.
• Otherwise, B chooses a random string K ∈ {0, 1}n, adds (R,⊥,U, K ,QB) into list L2, and sends m = DK (c) to the
adversary.
Forgery. Finally AI outputs a forged signcryption σ ∗ = (c∗, h∗, V ∗, v∗, R∗) on identities ID∗A, ID∗B , where σ ∗ is not the one
generated by the Signcrypt oracle and ID∗A has never been queried to the CertGen oracle. Let p∗1 = e(P, V ∗)e(Ppub,QA)h∗ and
p∗2 = gv∗PKh
∗
A . B will abort if (ID
∗
A, PK
∗
A) is not the ith H1 query. Otherwise, due to the forking lemma [42], by answering a
different value h∗′ ≠ h∗ to the query H3(c∗, p∗1, p∗2),AI can output another forged signcryption σ ∗′ = (c∗, h∗′, V ∗′, v∗′, R∗′).
If σ ∗, σ ∗′ are two valid signcryptions, we have p∗1 = e(P, V ∗)e(Ppub,QA)h∗ = e(P, V ∗)e(aP, bP)h∗ = e(P, V ∗ + abh∗P) and
p∗1 = e(P, V ∗′)e(Ppub,QA)h∗′ = e(P, V ∗′)e(aP, bP)h∗′ = e(P, V ∗′+ abh∗′P). It follows that V ∗′+ abh∗′P = V ∗+ abh∗P , andB
can solve the given instance of the CDH problem by abP = (h∗ − h∗′)−1(V ∗′ − V ∗).
We first consider the probability thatB does not abort during the simulation.
E1 :AI does not make certificate queries on (ID∗A, PK
∗
A).
E2 : At the forgery phase,AI chooses ID∗A as the challenge identity and its public key is PK
∗
A.
Therefore the probability thatB does not abort is
Pr[E1 ∧ E2] >

1− 1
qH1
qC
· 1
qH1
> (1/e) · 1
qH1
.
Here, e is the base of natural logarithm. Due to the forking lemma, the probability that AI can successfully forge two valid
signcryptions is at least (1/e) · 19qH1 (qS+1) in time e ·
23qH1 qH3 t
ε
. Thus B can calculate abP and e(abP, cP) with the same
probability. 
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Theorem 4. In the random oracle model, if there exists an EUF-CBSC-CMA adversary AII who is able to win Game 4 with an
advantage ε in polynomial time t, by making at most qHi queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), qPK public key queries, qR public key
replace queries, qK corruption queries, qS signcrypt queries and qD designcrypt queries. Then there exists an algorithm B which
can solve the GDH problem in G2 with an advantage at least (1/e) · 19qPK(qS+1) in time e ·
23qPKqH3 t
ε
. Here, e is the base of natural
logarithm.
Proof. Let P be the generator of G1 and g = e(P, P) ∈ G2. Algorithm B is given a random instance of the GDH problem
(g, ga, gb,ODDH), where ODDH is a DDH oracle.B’s goal is to output gab. AlgorithmB will runAII as a subroutine and act as
AII ’s challenger. B needs to maintain four lists L1, L2, L3, Lu which are initially empty. The lists L1, L2, L3 are used to keep
track of answers to queries asked byAII to oracles H1,H2,H3, and the list Lu is used to keep track of answers to public key
queries and public key replace queries. We assume that any H1 query on an identity ID happens afterAI ’s public key query
on ID. We also assume that any signcrypt queries or designcrypt queries on ID will only occur afterAII asks the hashing H1
of ID.
Setup.B sets g = e(P, P), randomly chooses s ∈ Z∗q as the master secret key, computes Ppub = sP as the master public key,
and sends them toAII .
Query.B interacts withAII as follows.
Public key queries. AII can make at most qPK queries on identities of its choice. Before any queries, B randomly chooses
i ∈ {1, . . . , qPK}. For the ith request, B responds with PKi = e(aP, P) and adds (IDi,⊥, PKi, 0) into list Lu. For requests on
IDU ≠ IDi,B searches a tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , •) in the list Lu. If the tuple existsB responds with PKU , otherwise it randomly
chooses sU ∈ Z∗q , sends PKU = g sU toAII , and adds a new tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , 0) into list Lu.
H1 queries. On a query H1(IDU , PKU),B searches a tuple (IDU , PKU , bu) in the list Lu. If such a tuple is found B responds
with H1(IDU , PKU) = buP , otherwise it randomly chooses bu ∈ Z∗q , adds (IDU , PKU , bu) into list L1, and responds with
H1(IDU , PKU) = buP .
Public key replace queries. For a public key replace query (IDU , PK),B aborts if IDU = IDi. Otherwise, B searches a tuple
(IDU , •, PKU , •) in the list Lu. If no such tuple is found B adds (IDU ,⊥, PK, 1) into list Lu, else B replaces the tuple with
(IDU ,⊥, PK, 1).
H2 queries. On a query H2(R, T ,U),B searches list L2.
• If there is a tuple (R, T ,U, K , •, •) in L2,B sends K to the adversary.• Else, if there is a tuple (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) in L2,B sends (g, PKA, PKB,U) to ODDH. If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’,B sends K
to the adversary and replaces (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB)with (R, T ,U, K , PKA, PKB).• Otherwise,B responds with a randomly chosen string K ∈ {0, 1}n and adds (R, T ,U, K , •, •) into list L2.
H3 queries. On a query H3(c, p1, p2),B searches a tuple (c, p1, p2, h) in the list L3. If such a tuple is found B responds with
h, otherwise it returns a random h ∈ Z∗q and adds (c, p1, p2, h) into list L3.
Corruption queries. For a corruption query on IDU , if IDU = IDi thenB aborts. Otherwise,B searches a tuple (IDU , sU , PKU , •)
in the list Lu. If such a tuple is found B responds with sU , otherwise it runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to obtain (sU , PKU),
adds (IDU , sU , PKU , 0) into list Lu and responds with sU .
Signcrypt queries. We now show howB can answer a signcrypt query (m, IDA, IDB). Let PKA and PKB be the public keys of IDA
and IDB respectively. Note that, if fA = 1, the public key of IDA has been replaced andAII needs to provide the corresponding
secret key sA. There are two possible cases:
(1) If IDA is not the ith public key query,B can respond with the output of Signcrypt(m, sA, CertA, PKB).
(2) Otherwise B generates the signcryption as follows. B first chooses V ∈ G1, r1, v, h ∈ Z∗q , computes R = r1QA and
T = e(R, CertB). After that, B chooses a random K ∈ {0, 1}n, adds (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) into the list L2 and computes
c = EK (m). It then computes p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = gvPKhA. If L3 already contains a tuple (c, p1, p2, h′) with
h′ ≠ h, thenB repeats the process with another choice of (V , v, r1, h) until finding a tuple (c, p1, p2, h)whose first two
elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L3. Once an admissible tuple (c, p1, p2, h) is found,B adds it on L3 and sends
a valid ciphertext (c, h, V , v, R) toAII .
Designcrypt queries. We now show how B can correctly decrypt a signcryption (σ = (c, h, V , v, R), IDA, IDB). Let PKA and
PKB be the public keys of IDA and IDB respectively. If fB = 1,AII needs to provide the corresponding secret key sB.
(1) If IDB is not the ith public key query,B can perform a normal decryption using the corresponding certificate and secret
key sB.
(2) Otherwise,B computes p1 = e(P, V )e(Ppub,QA)h, p2 = gvPKhA. If h ≠ H3(c, p1, p2), then σ is invalid and an error symbol⊥ is returned to the adversary. Otherwise, it computes T = e(R, CertB) and searches a tuple (R, T , •, K , •, •) in the list
L2.• If the tuple has the form (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) or (R, T ,U, K , PKA, PKB),B computes m = DK (c) and sends m to the
adversary.
• Otherwise, the tuple has the form (R, T ,U, K , •, •).B sends (g, PKA, PKB,U) to ODDH.
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If the oracle returns ‘‘1’’, B replaces (R, T ,U, K , •, •) with (R, T ,U, K , PKA, PKB) and sends m = DK (c) to the
adversary.
Otherwise, B chooses a random string K ∈ {0, 1}n, adds (R, T ,⊥, K , PKA, PKB) into list L2, and sends m = DK (c) to
the adversary.
Forgery. FinallyAII outputs a forged signcryption σ ∗ = (c∗, h∗, V ∗, v∗, R∗) on identities ID∗A, ID∗B , where σ ∗ is not an output
from the Signcrypt oracle and ID∗A has never been queried on the Corruption oracle. Let p∗1 = e(P, V ∗)e(Ppub,QA)h∗ and
p∗2 = gv∗PKh
∗
A . B aborts if ID
∗
A is not the ith public key query. Otherwise, due to the forking lemma [42], by answering a
different value h∗′ ≠ h∗ to the query H3(c∗, p∗1, p∗2),AII can output another forged signcryption σ ∗′ = (c∗, h∗′, V ∗′, v∗′, R∗′).
If σ ∗, σ ∗′ are two valid signcryptions, we have p∗2 = gv∗PKh
∗
A = gv∗ + ah∗ and p∗2 = gv∗′PKh
∗′
A = gv∗′+ah∗′ . It follows that
v∗ + ah∗ = v∗′ + ah∗′. Thus B can calculate a = (v∗′ − v∗)(h∗ − h∗′)−1 and solve the given instance of GDH problem by
calculating (gb)a.
We now consider the probability thatB does not abort during the simulation.
E1 :AII does not make corruption queries on ID∗A.
E2 : At the forgery phase,AII chooses ID∗A as the challenge identity.
Therefore the probability thatB does not abort is
Pr[E1 ∧ E2] >

1− 1
qPK
qK
· 1
qPK
> (1/e)
1
qPK
.
Here, e is the base of natural logarithm. Due to the forking lemma, the probability that AII can successfully produce two
valid signcryptions is at least (1/e) · 19qPK(qS+1) in time e ·
23qPKqH3 t
ε
. Thus,B’s success probability of solving the GDH problem
is at least (1/e) · 19qPK(qS+1) in time e ·
23qPKqH3 t
ε
. 
5.2. Efficiency
In this subsection, we discuss the efficiency of our new certificate-based signcryption. According to the analysis given in
Section 4, the LWZ scheme is not secure, and therefore we do not compare our scheme with it. We use some symbols
p, exp, E,D as abbreviations for bilinear pairing operation, exponentiation in G2, symmetric encryption and decryption
respectively. |G1|, |G2|, |Z∗q | and |c| represent the bit length of element in G1,G2, Z∗q and length of symmetric encryption.
The following table shows the computation and communication costs of our new scheme.
Computation cost Communication cost
Scheme Signcrypt Designcrypt Ciphertext length Public key length
Our scheme 4 exp+E 2p+ 4 exp+D |c| + 2|Z∗q | + 2|G1| |G2|
6. Conclusion
This paper, for the first time, introduced public key replace attacks into certificate-based signcryption and defined an
enhanced security model. We demonstrated that the LWZ scheme is insecure by two concrete attacks: it does not satisfy
ciphertext indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and is existentially forgeable under chosenmessage
attacks. Furthermore, a new certificate-based signcryption scheme is proposed. Our new scheme is proven secure in the
random oracle model under classic complexity assumptions.
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